Building upon previous research and potentially pointing out its limitations is essential for a healthy working of the scientific community, as it allows science to self-correct and evolve. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to investigate the incentives of scientists to perform these activities of control and criticism. The two-player game includes a scientist producing a new scientific result, and another scientist who can verify that result. The quality of the new result depends on the amount of effort chosen by a scientist. A high-quality paper would stand against any future work building on it, whereas a low-quality paper presents limitations that are detected only if verification through additional work occurs. We show that a certain fraction of low-quality scientific knowledge characterizes all the equilibria in the basic version of model. As a consequence, the absence of low-quality research in a field must interpreted as the lack of verification activity and then as a potential source of concern. We suggest that increasing the benefit that a scientist derives from building and potentially qualifying previous research should be considered as a primary way to improve scientific research reliability. By contrast, softening overall incentives to publish per se does not have an impact on research quality, although it increases the fraction of low-quality papers that are identified. Abstract Building upon previous research and potentially pointing out its limitations is essential for a healthy working of the scientic community, as it allows science to self-correct and evolve. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to investigate the incentives of scientists to perform these activities of control and criticism. The two-player game includes a scientist producing a new scientic result, and another scientist who can verify that result. The quality of the new result depends on the amount of e¤ort chosen by a scientist. A high-quality paper would stand against any future work building on it, whereas a low-quality paper presents limitations that are detected only if verication through additional work occurs. We show that a certain fraction of low-quality scientic knowledge characterizes all the equilibria in the basic version of model. As a consequence, the absence of low-quality research in a eld must interpreted as the lack of verication activity and then as a potential source of concern. We suggest that increasing the benet that a scientist derives from building and potentially qualifying previous research should be considered as a primary way to improve scientic research reliability. By contrast, softening overall incentives to publish per se does not have an impact on research quality, although it increases the fraction of low-quality papers that are identied.
Introduction
The importance of science for economic growth and social welfare is widely recognized (Stephan, 2012) . When referring to scientic knowledge, one has typically in mind knowledge that is "true." However, not all the outcomes of scientic activities have this characteristic.
An interest toward understanding whether and why science can "go wrong", while originally conned within the boundaries of specialists in the scientic community, has more recently been displayed also by policymakers and the public opinion concerned about the economic and social consequences of these phenomena, as witnessed, for example, by a long report in a recent issue of the Economist (October 19th, 2013).
Scientic fraud is an extreme case of production of false knowledge (Broad and Wade, 1982; Lacetera and Zirulia, 2011) . More commonly and frequently, however, the scientic results that are reported in journals might have not been checked against all potential robustness tests, may rely on questionable methods of inquiry, or may contain honest mistakes.
In some cases awed or erroneous results, just like fraudulent ones, are retracted from publications (Azoulay et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2013) ; most often, they are just seen as a "natural" step toward better theories and ndings. Karl Poppers view of science, for example, holds that a nding or theory can be dened as scientic to the extent that it is falsiable (Popper, 1959) . Therefore, at each given time, the body of scientic knowledge will include ndings that are limited or awed in some ways. Over time, the reliability of a scientic proposition 2 will have less and less uncertainty as long as new results, conrming or falsifying the original ones, are accumulated (Howson and Urbach, 1989 ).
The history of science provides numerous examples of how accepted ndings have been challenged by subsequent research, and of how improvements and corrections in some cases, and full-blown controversies in others, have conducted to a better understanding of a given phenomenon. The Copernican revolution benetted from and was rened also by critiques to some of its aspects, even if coming from scholars who were, overall, claiming wrong theories; for example, Tycho Brahes observations about some inconsistencies in the Copernican view led to important improvements of it (Sherwood, 2011) . More recently, for example, the body of research that led to identifying the causes and transimission mechanisms of HIV, its connection to AIDS, and to device treatments for the disease, proceeded through progressive criticisms and falsications of earlier results, for example obtained with less reliable empirical strategies (from the analysis of individual occurencies, to case-control studies, to randomized clinical trials; Holmberg, 2008) . Also, theories and evidence on global warming, which are gaining more (though not denitive) consensus, are improved and rened also thanks to the counterarguments and evidence of scholars who are more skeptic about the anthropogenic nature of climate change (Eggers and Carpi, 2011; Sherwood, 2011) . Building upon previous research and potentially identifying its limitations can therefore be seen as essential for a healthy working of the scientic community, as it allows science to self-correct and evolve.
But what are the incentives of scientists to perform these activities of controls and criticism? Will these activities always improve upon or correct previous ndings, or, conversely, shall we expect some degree of imprecision at any given time? And what determines the incidence of imperfect science and of the e¤ort to improve upon it and produce higher-quality research? In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to address these questions.
We study the interplay between the incentives to provide accurate, or reliable, results on the one hand, and the incentives to verify the validity of previous ndings by peers. In the game, there are two players, a scientist producing a new scientic result, and another 3 scientist who could verify that result. The quality of the new result depends on the amount of (costly) e¤ort chosen by a scientist. A high-quality paper would stand against any scrutiny, whereas a low-quality paper presents aws that are detected only if verication occurs; absent verication, high and low-quality paper are indistinguishable to the scientic community.
We show that a certain fraction of low-quality scientic knowledge characterizes all the equilibria of the basic version of model. In particular, if the benets from verication are low (or the costs are high), verication does not occur and consequenlty low-quality papers are not identied. Conversely, if the incentives towards verication are high enough, then these activities are performed with positive probabilty, and the expected quality of research is higher. An implication of this result is that never observing low-quality research in a scientic occurs because of the lack of any verication activity and, as such, can be a source of concern. In the region of the parameters where verication occurs with positive probability, an increase in the identication of low-quality research goes together with an increase in the expected quality of research. In terms of normative implications, we suggest that increasing the benet from verication (which may be obtained also giving more recognition to incremental research) should be considered as a primary way to improve scientic research reliability. Along these lines, in an extension of the model where scientists can obtain positive benets also from conrmatory results (i.e. verifying high-quality papers), we show that low-quality research can be eliminated. Similarly, reducing the costs that scientists incur when verifying the results of others increases research quality. This highlights an important role for "incremental" research aimed at reinforcing, limiting, or even just conrm previous ndings. In contrast, reducing the value of a publication for the knowledge originator, as some scholars have suggested (for example by softening the "publish or perish" paradigm), does not have an impact on research quality, although it increases the fraction of low-quality papers that are identied. to the time allocation of a scientist into genuinely replicable articles and seemingly replicable articles, the former being undistinguishable from the latter but more costly to produce. In general some non-replicable research will be produced in equilibrium. Although in a di¤erent way, both Mirowski and Skivas and Wible make the extent to which research is replicable endogenous. With respect to these papers, our work makes a contribution in two directions.
First, we allow that the scientist himself may be ex-ante uncertain about the quality of his work, while at the same time controlling (in part) the quality level by the choice of e¤ort level. In this way, we enrich the nature of the strategic interaction among the scientists playing di¤erent roles in the scientic community. Second, we perform an explicit analysis of the determinants of research quality, which alllows us also to investigate the likely e¤ects of the various interventions that have been proposed to increase the quality and reliability of research.
The model shares some features with Lacetera and Zirulia (2011) , who analyze the incentives for committing and detecting fraudulent research, and derive the likelihood for fraudulent articles to be submitted, published, and not be caught. In that paper it is assumed that the projects probability of success is exogenous: in case of an unsuccesful project, the scientist can nevertheless submit a paper, thus committing a fraud. Here the probability of a paper being of high quality that is endogenous, because it depends on the scientists e¤ort.
This di¤erent assumption signicantly changes the nature of the game, as well as the results. 
The model 2.1 The basic game
There are two players: the scientist (S) and the colleague (C). The scientist S (he) is the originator of a new scientic result, i.e. the producer of some new knowledge, which, for simplicity, we assume to be published as a journal article. The colleague C (she) decides whether to undertake activities to verify the quality of Ss work. Through his choice of e¤ort, S a¤ects the quality of the knowledge that he produces, which can be high or low. A high-quality paper is a paper that, if scrutizined by C, does not show errors or signicant lack of robustness. Otherwise, the paper is low quality. Absent Cs attempt of verication, high quality and low quality papers are indistinguishable both for S and C, and thererefore 6 provide the same benet to S and C.
More formally, S can choose between high e¤ort (e H ) and low e¤ort (e L ). If S chooses e H , then the paper is of high quality with probability 1; if S chooses e L ; then the paper is of high quality with probability p [0; 1): e H and e L denote both the feasible actions for S, and their associated costs, with e H e L 0: C can choose between verifying the quality of the results by S, which we denote as action v, or not verify (action nv). If C chooses v, then it bears a cost C1e = C(e H 0 e L ) 0, where C 1 is a parameter that indicates that the verication cost for C will be generally higher than Ss additional cost to produce a high-quality paper, i.e. 1e: Following v, the uncertainty concerning the quality of the paper is fully resolved. For S, the benet obtained when C plays nv, or when she plays v and the paper is of high quality, is B S ; the benet is 0 when C plays v and the paper turns out to be of low quality. C obtains a positive benet B C B S when she plays v and the paper is low quality, and 0 otherwise. Both players are risk-neutral.
Throughtout the paper, we shall assume that the e¤ort choice by S is not observed by C.
Therefore, this is a game of imperfect information akin to a simultanous-move game, with Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. The game is presented in normal form in Table 1 .
A discussion of the assumptions
In this section we provide a discussion of the key assumptions of the model, and the interpretation of the key parameters to which we will refer when commenting upon the results. First, the model assumes that S can obtain a high-quality paper (and the corresponding benet) with certainty if he exerts high e¤ort. That high e¤ort excludes low quality papers just simplies the analysis by allowing us to focus on our main point, i.e. that the reliabitly of a scientic result is endogenous, depending on the prevailing incentives in the scientic community. More importantly, the model represents a view of science as a process of search for the "true state of the world", in which high (low) e¤ort yields a perfect (imperfect) signal and S and C are indi¤erent with respect to the true state. In other words we exclude bias, both of S and C, in favor or against a specic scientic result, e.g. a positive result conrming a theory or a negative result rejecting it.
Second, B S is the value of a publication for which low quality was not identied. An implication of this assumption is that S does not obtain any additional benet if his paper is scrutinized and turns out to be of high quality. For example, if this is the case, the work of C is less likely to be published, and does not reduce the impact of Ss paper. A second implication is that S does not take into account the expected quality of the paper, which he knows given the e¤ort exerted. Thus, any intrinsic reward from high quality that S can get is not considered here, although the same e¤ect may be captured by a lower value of the cost e H : In our interpretation, the value of B S can be seen as primarily inuenced by the prestige of the journal where the research is published, by the institutional context (such as "the publish or perish" attitude) or by personal characteristics of S, such as at the career stage.
Third, notice that B S does not depend on e¤ort. Therefore, higher e¤ort does not lead to "better" scientic results, e.g. results that are more general or more relevant in some dimensions and which could lead to more cited publications, or appearing in more prestigious journals (Ellison, 2002 ). In our model, higher quality is associated to a characteristic of research, i.e. its reliability, which becomes evident only when the paper is scrutinized. High e¤ort by S, then, should be rather been interpreted as "internal replication" (Hamermesh, 2007) and for that reason we will refer to 1e (which appears in both S and C payo¤s) as verication costs.
As for the modeling of player C, we rst notice that the notion of verication that we use to denote her action should be intended broadly. First, it includes direct replication. Second, it may take the form of design replication, whereby an alternative research design is used to answer the same questions (Muma, 1993) . Finally, it applies also to conceptual (Wible, 1998) or scientic (Hamermesh, 2007) replication, where a di¤erent experiment, or analysis, is conducted, but in a way that might inform on the solidity of the original result. What these forms of verication have in common is that they tend to guarantee a reward to the 8 replicator only if they negatively a¤ect the validity or applicability of the original research, thus potentially a¤ecting (to some degree) the benets of author of the original work. Direct replication is rarely observed; design and conceptual replications are more common, with the latter being often in the form of incremental research, i.e. additional inquiry on a given topic as opposed to the undertaking of an entirely new subject of analysis. As a second remark on C, the parameter C plays a particularly important role, as it measures the extent to which verication is more costly for C than the "internal" verication by S. Values of C greater than 1 can be justied, for example, by the esistence of some private information about the project that make it simpler for S to perform additional checks (Collins, 1985) . At the same time, C is a parameter that can be at least partially a¤ected by the rules of the scientic community. For instance, journal policies that favor the access to the original data have the e¤ect of reducing C; although the "manipulability" of this parameter may be limited by constraints such as the proprietary nature of data. As for B C , the benet of discovering a low-quality paper may come from publication and visibility. Finally, assuming that the paper quality is known with certainty after Cs replication excludes from the analysis the fact that replication activities themselves are subject to uncertainty with respect to their reliability.
Results

The Nash equilibria of the game
For all values of the parameters, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is either in pure strategies or mixed strategies according to di¤erent parameter values. The pure strategy equilibrium displayes low e¤ort and no verication, whereas in the mixed-strategy equilibrium there is a positive probablity of performing high e¤ort and of verifying a paper. This is formalized in the following proposition. ; then the Nash Equilibrium is in mixed strategies, with S playing e H with probability 1 0 From Proposition 1, we can also determine the likelihoods of two events that will constitute the subject of our comparative exercises below: i) the probability that a paper is of high quality, which is a measure of actual reliability of scientic knowledge (independently of what is observed); and ii) the probabiliy that papers are of low quality and they are identied as such. In determining such probabilities we impose C = 1; this is without loss of generality because what is relevant here is only the ratio
Proposition 2 The probability that the paper is of high quality is:
Pr(high quality) =
The probability that a low quality paper is identied is:
Pr(low quality and identif ied) = 
Figures 1 and 2 report Pr("high quality") and Pr(low quality and identif ied) as a function of "e; for di¤erent values of (1 0 p)B c . The probability that a paper is of high quality is non-increasing in the verication cost "e: If "e is large (with respect to Cs expected gain from verication), then no verication occurs, and the fraction of high-quality papers only depends on the exogenous probability p. If "e is low (with respect to Cs expected gain from verication), then the lower "e; the larger the fraction of high quality papers because exerting higher e¤ort is less costly for S. Note, however, that verication activities by C, although being less costly, are less frequent because the probability to nd a low-quality paper is smaller.
We also notice that, in the mixed-strategy equilibrium region, larger benets B C from identifying a low-quality paper (or a lower cost via a reduction in C) increase the fraction of high quality papers: because verication is more rewarding (or less costly), S must increase his e¤ort in order to reduce Cs incentives to verify. However, the probability that the paper is of high quality does not depend on B S , i.e. the value of a publication. To understand the intuition for this, consider that for a given intensity of Cs control (i..e for given value of r), the marginal e¤ect of B S on the Ss payo¤ is 1 when he exerts high e¤ort, and rp+(10r) < 1 when he exerts low e¤ort, because in this case S must take into account that the value of publication is lost if the papers turns out to be of low quality and it is identied as such. In that respect, then, high e¤ort, and consequently, high-quality papers become more attractive because the cost of losing the publication value is larger. However, as a consequence of this, C responds to the increase in B S by lowering the intensity of her (costly) verication activity, making e L more attractive until the point in which S is again indi¤erent between high and low e¤ort.
We next look at the probability that a paper is of low quality and is identied as such.
First, notice that this probability is positive when "e is "low" and zero when "e is "high".
Also, the probability of high quality papers if unambigously higher when some low quality papers are identied than when no low quality papers are discovered. In other words, the absence in a eld of scientic results that are found to be of low quality (false, oawed, limited, or less relevant that initially believed), rather than a signal of the absence of these types of papers, must interpreted as the lack of any verication activities activity and then as a source of concern. As we will see in the extension of the model discussed in Section 4, this may not hold only if, somewhat contrary to the current structure of incentives in science, conrmatory results, i.e. coming from the verication of a high quality paper, provide a large benet to C.
However, in the region of mixed-strategy equilibrium, lower verication costs imply both higher expected quality and lower rate of low-quality discovery; this occurs because both low quality papers and verication activities are less frequent. The same e¤ect occurs for an increase in B C ; but in this case this is due to the increase e¤ort by S. The probability of verication by C, indeed, does not depend on B C : an increase in the reward from discovery a low quality paper operates as a threat that "discipline" Ss behavior, leaving the intensity of the verication activity una¤acted. As a consequence, observing a reduction of the frequency of low quality papers that are discovered (but not their disappearance!) is a good sign, because it is unambigously associated to higher expected quality of research.
Note, nally, that the probability of identifying low-quality papers is negatively a¤ected by B S . Therefore, an increase in the value of publication reduces the probability that lowquality papers are recognized as such, but without a¤ecting the probability that such papers are produced. The intuition is that, when publications are more valuable, the opportunity cost of low e¤ort is in fact higher: as a consequence, C may save on verication activities while leaving S indi¤ferent between high and low e¤ort.
Extension: a value for conrmatory results
The model can extended in several directions. In this section we briey discuss a case where C can obtain a positive reward even when verifying a paper that turns out to be of high quality.
In this case, the normal form of the game is expressed by the payo¤ matrix in Table 2 , where B H C (B L C ) corresponds to the value for C of discovering a high (low)-quality publication, with B H C B L C . Nash equilibria of the game are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3
The equilibrium of the game is unique. In particular, i) if 1e >
The main insight from this extension is that allowing C to gain utility from the verication of high-quality research enlarges the set of possible equilibria. In particular, when 1e is small enough, C can prefer to verify even if the research by S is of high quality with probability 1.
Thus, if conrmatory results are positively valued by the scientic community, it is possible that low-quality papers cease to exist. Moreover, for intermediate values of
; the verication activity of C does not deter S from exerting low e¤ort. In these two cases the expected quality of papers radically di¤ers, being respectively the highest and the lowest possible quality in the model. In other words, verication is a necessary, but not a su¢cient condition for high-quality research.
5 Improving the quality of scientic production: a normative perspective
In recent years, numerous discussions about the functioning of the scientic community have been undertaken, leading to various proposals for enhancing the quality and reliability of scientic research. Our model can be used to provide insights upon some of the proposals that have been advanced as well as about some of the current trends in the scientic community.
Several authors have identied in the lack of proper incentives towards replication, in its various forms as decribed above, including performing incremental research upon existing and "established" ndings, a main driver of potential scientic unreliability. Recently, for example, the 2013 Medicine Nobel Laureate Randy Schekman announced that he would not send his papers to some of the major science journals, in particular because they excessively select "novel", "newsworhty" ndings at the expense of rigor and depth fo inquiry, which is always given by additional work on an exisiting eld (Schekman, 2013) . does not characterize the current incentive structure of the scientic community) might lead to the reduction of low-quality papers, while keeping verication activities in place. In terms of discovery of low-quality research, our model suggests that we should expect an increase, if starting from a situation when verication activities were not performed; or a decrease otherwise.
Another frequent belief, sometimes considered equivalent to the one just discussed, is that the quality of scientic research may be negatively a¤ected by too high-powered incentives to publish; proposals have therefore been advanced to soften the "publish-or-perish" paradigm (Abelson, 1985; Giles, 2007; Schekman, 2013) . Our model shows, however, that acting directly on the incentives to publish may be di¤erent from increasing the incentives for incremental or conrmatory research, or other forms of verication. In particular, the expected quality of research would be una¤ected by softening publication incentives alone (a reduction in B S ) , as argued in Section 3.1. However, the fraction of low-quality papers that could be recognized as such would increase when publication incentives are weaker because of a more intense control activity by C. This will be socially valuable as well, since it will reduce the uncertainty concerning scientic research quality. Also, a reduction in the publish-and-perish attitude can be interpreted as a reduction of the relative value of (supposedly) path-breaking research with respect to more incremental research, causing a simultaneous decrease in B S and increase in B C . From previous discussions, this would simultaneously increase research quality and the identication of low quality research.
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Conclusions
Although simple, our model conveys a number of relevant insights about the operating of the overall scientic endeavor, and to clarify how di¤erent rules and incentives a¤ect the quality and reliability of scientic production. The basic mechanisms analyzed here, in particular, There are a number of avenues for further extensions of the model. Within the current model structure, the relaxation fo some assumptions may lead to interesting developments.
For instance, we could allow S to get a benet from conrmation of his results by C. Similarly, we could consider the case of observable e¤ort, and then compare the results with those obtained in Section 3. Finally, we could introduce scientists bias in favor or against certain hypotheses or ndings. 
A Proofs
Proof or proposition 1. To see that (e L ; nv) can be a Nash equilibrium, notice that e L is the best response to nv. If S chooses e L , then C prefers nv if (1 0 p)B C 0 C1e < 0, i.e. 1e > . However, in order for S to play e L in response, the condition is that B S 0 e H < pB S 0 e L or 1e > (1 0 p)B S : Because by assumption B C B S , the two conditions cannot be simultaneously satised. Finally, to see that pure equlibria involving high e¤ort do not exist, notice that Cs best response to e H is no check, but Ss best response to no check is e L .
As for the mixed strategy equilibrium, we denote with q the probability that S plays e H , and r as the probality that C plays v. For S to be indi¤erent between e H and e L it must be: B S 0 e H = r(pB S 0 e L ) + (1 0 r)(B S 0 e L ) from which we obtain:
For C to be indi¤erent between v and nv it must be that:
0qC1e + (1 0 q)((1 0 p)B C 0 C1e) = 0 from which we derive: 
:
Proof of Proposition 2 In equilibrium, a paper is of high quality with probability 1 if S exerts high e¤ort, and with probability p if he exerts low e¤ort. Therefore, Pr(high quality) = q 3 + (1 0 q 3 )p: The discovery of low-quality papers occurs if i) S exerts low e¤ort, ii) the paper is actually of low quality; and iii) C chooses to verify. The corresponding probability is Pr(low quality and verif ied) = (1 0 q 3 )(1 0 p)r 3 :
Proof of Proposition 3 First, we determine the existence of pure strategy equilibria. If S chooses e H, C will play v as long as B H C 0 C1e > 0; i.e. 1e < As it concerns the mixed strategy equilibrium, we denote with r the probability for C to play v and with q the probability for S to play e L . The indi¤erence condition for S is:
B S 0 e H = r(pB S 0 e L ) + (1 0 r)(B S 0 e L ) from which we obtain: r 3 = 
